Showing posts sorted by date for query bill ackman. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query bill ackman. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, May 15, 2020

Open letter to Institutional Investor Magazine

Last night Australian time Institutional Investor published a piece on Bronte Capital's position in Herbalife.

To quote the opening sentence:

Australian hedge fund manager John Hempton, the co-founder of Bronte Capital, has turned out to be a true believer in Herbalife, the controversial multilevel marketing company that has been under investigation by one federal agency or another for several years. Over the past year, Hempton doubled down on Herbalife...

I observed on twitter that contrary to standard journalism ethics the author (Michelle Celarier) did not seek our comment before publishing.

She told me to check my email. So I did. Ms Celarier did in fact send something.

Here it is:

Michelle Celarier
01:15 (12 hours ago)

Hi John 
I am writing a news story for Institutional Investor about your investment in Herbalife, as you disclosed updated filings for the quarter.   
I note that you've been adding to your position over the past year, according to the SEC. 
I also quote from your recent letter about Herbalife-- and note your performance this calendar year. 
Just wanted to let you know about this. I'm on deadline, so if you have further comment please respond asap. 
Thank you 
Michelle

Michelle Celarier
michellecelarier.com
917 971 0279
m.celarier@gmail.com 
Follow me on twitter @mcelarier
You will notice that this came at 1.15AM Australian time. It came when I was (and could reasonably be expected to be asleep). The story was published before I woke up at approximately 6AM.

This is a clear breach of journalist ethics. But it is also sloppy and demonstrates what happens when you do not check your facts.

There are two reasons our Herbalife position has increased.

a). Our fund was closed and it re-opened. We got considerable flows. We adjusted the Herbalife position to match the flows.

b). We sold a large position in the 50s (when Bill Ackman covered) and we repurchased it (and then some) at lower prices.

The second one is instructive. If you sell a $1000 worth of Herbalife stock at $53 and buy it back at $27 you will wind up with more Herbalife stock. (This trade matches some of what actually happened in our book.)

For these reasons our Herbalife stock position (measured in number of shares) has increased considerably.

But the position measured in the percentage of the fund at cost has actually shrunk. We did not "double-down" as the article suggests - we actually took some off the table.

The article is false and should be withdrawn.

The statement that we doubled-down is contrary to both our risk management policy and what actually happened.

That said: for the record we still think the stock is a good value at this price. We have a full-sized position now (or we would buy more). But that is not a newsworthy story. The only story Michelle Celarier has is that a fund manager is bullish about a stock they own.





John Hempton

Thursday, March 19, 2020

Coronavirus – getting angry

I am going to give you a few stylised facts about severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 and the data.
First – no matter what you say about the Chinese data – and the Chinese data was full of lies at first – China has controlled the outbreak. Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing are all functional mega-cities with no obvious health catastrophes.
The virus has been managed to very low infection rates in Singapore and Taiwan. The numbers (completely real) in Korea show a dramatic slowdown in infection.
Korea has not shut restaurants and the like. The place is functioning. But it has had rigorous quarantine of the infected and very widespread testing. It has complete social buy-in.
China tests your temperature when you get on a bus or a train. It tests you when you go into a classroom, it tests you when you enter a building. There is rigorous and enforced quarantine.
But life goes on – and only a few are dying.
In Singapore nobody has died (yet) though I expect a handful to do so before this over. This is sad (especially for the affected families) but it is not a mega-catastrophe.
There is a story in the Financial Times about a town in the middle of the hot-zone in Italy where they have enforced quarantine and tested everyone in the town twice. They have no cases.
The second stylized fact – mortality differs by availability of hospital beds
A.    Coronavirus provided you do not run out of hospital beds probably has a mortality of about 1 percent. In a population that is very old (such as some areas in Italy) the mortality will be higher. In a population that is very young base mortality should be lower. Also co-morbidities such as smoking matter.
B.    If you run out of ICU beds (ventilators/forced oxygen) every incremental person who needs a ventilator dies. This probably takes your mortality to two percent.
C.     Beyond that a lot of people get a pneumonia that would benefit from supplemental oxygen. If you run out of hospital beds many of these people also die. Your mortality edges higher - but the only working case we have is Iran and you can't trust their data. That said a lot of young people require supplementary oxygen and will die. If you are 40 and you think this does not apply to you then you are wrong. Mass infection may kill you. Iran has said that 15 percent of their dead are below 40
I will put this in an American perspective with a 70 percent strike rate by the end.
Option A: 2 million dead
Option B: 4 million dead
Option C: maybe 6 million dead.
By contrast, Singapore: a handful of dead.
China has demonstrated this virus can be controlled. The town in Italy has demonstrated it can be controlled even where it is rife.
Life goes on in Singapore. Schools are open. Restaurants are open in Korea.
The right policy is not “herd immunity” or even “flattening the curve”. The right policy is to try to eliminate as many cases as possible and to strictly control and test to keep cases to a bare minimum for maybe 18 months while a vaccine is produced.
The alternative is literally millions of people dying completely unnecessarily.
What is required is a very sharp lockdown to get Ro well below one – and put the virus into exponential decay.
When the numbers are low enough – say six weeks – you let the quarantine off – but with Asian style monitoring. Everyone has their temperature measured regularly. Quarantine is rigid and enforced. You hand your phone over if you are infected and your travel routes and your contacts are bureaucratically reconstructed (as is done in Singapore). And we get through.
And in a while the scientists save us with a vaccine.
The economic costs will be much lower. Indeed life in three months will be approximately normal.
The social costs will be much lower.
Every crisis has its underlying source. And you want to throw as much resources (and then some) close to the source. Everything else is peripheral.
The last crisis was a monetary crisis and it had a monetary solution.
This is a virus crisis and it has a virology solution.
Asian Governments are not inherently superior to ours – but they have done a much better job of it than ours. The end death toll in China (probably much higher than stated) will wind up much smaller than the Western death tolls. I do not understand our idiocy.




John


PS. Longtime followers of this blog will know that I have rarely publicly agreed with Bill Ackman. I do here. This minimises economic and social cost of the virus. I am not sure the stock market bounces hard with a rational policy, only that it minimises the damage.

I regard the current course of English speaking democracies (other than New Zealand) as mass murder by the political elite. I think history will regard it that way too.


Saturday, April 20, 2019

Mattel: Buybacks, Barbie and dead babies

I used to be of the view that suggested that buybacks were just another way of distributing to shareholders - a bit like dividends, selectively applied.

You could turn a buyback into a dividend by selling your own shares in precisely the proportion that the company bought shares back. Then your percentage ownership was unchanged and you would have (in cash) your share of the monies that the company distributed to its owners.

I used to think that. But it isn't quite true because companies can impair themselves with buybacks in ways that you just couldn't with dividends. Few companies support paying dividends at 2x underlying cash generation. But debt funded buybacks of this size are alas fairly common.

Debt funded buybacks, applied to their illogical limit, will corrupt you, and turn you into a gebbeth - inhabited by the debt (and its evils) you have allowed into your body.

First however I need to recount a parable about how leverage corrupts morality.

Valeant and the price of Syprine

Syprine is an old drug, out of patent for years that is a treatment for Wilsons disease. Wilsons disease is a disorder where copper builds up in your blood eventually killing you. If you take Syprine you lead a symptom-free normal life. 

There are a few thousand people with Wilsons disease in the United States and as it was a minor disorder there was a single supplier of Syprine.

Valeant bought this single supplier. They cranked the price to $400,000 for a years supply and took every asset of every sufferer they could find.

Pay up or die.

Valeant instituted a patient subsidy program so that they could crank the prices to levels that no patient could afford and then drop the price (through the subsidy) to a level where they could strip every asset of every sufferer. They found precisely how much a Wilson's disease sufferer had, and they took the lot.

Valeant bought up all the raw-material suppliers for the drug so no alternative supply could make it the market. They either bought up or intimidated all the veterinary suppliers of Syprine so that veterinary supplies couldn't be diverted. Horses get Wilsons disease too but a few (hundred) dead horses were the collateral damage in Valeant's plan to extract huge rents from an old-and-out-patent drug.

Eventually this got to a Congressional hearing and Bill Ackman (the activist investor then on the board of directors of Valeant) promised to go to a director meeting and get Valeant to drop their prices on Syprine.

But Valeant didn't drop its price despite the promises of its (then) largest shareholder, because if they had dropped their prices on Syprine they would not have been able to pay their debt.

Normal people do not tell Congress they will do something and then do the exact opposite. But add in enough debt and decent people will become evil. 

That is what happened with Syprine and Valeant.

In the Valeant case the debt came from buying pharmaceutical companies at very high prices. But in the case I am going to show you (Mattel) the leverage can just come from buying back stock.

And the lesson for management teams is if you buy back enough stock at the wrong price you too can become evil.

But let's start with what went wrong with Mattel.

Mattel, a toy story

Toys are not an easy business. They have a competitor: computer games. Once upon a time if you looked at Mattel it broke down into girls toys and boys toys. Girls toys meant Barbie. Boys toys meant Matchbox (cars) and Hot Wheels. 

These were evergreen, growing sales year after year, decade after decade. 

Then along came computer games. And boys toys in particular were hit badly. Once upon a time you could sell a Matchbox car to a nine year old. Nowadays the competition is Mario Kart, and frankly Mario Kart is more exciting.

These days the only people who buy Matchbox cars are 3 years olds and creepy 45 year old men. 

It is not as if you can't grow a toy company - but the focus is generally younger and younger. Spin Master grew a large (listed) toy company from nowhere on the success of Hatchimals. A fairly large unlisted toy company was built on the success of Shopkins and other toys aimed at younger children. 

With a savvy enough social media strategy you could even make a success of some traditional boys toys. Nerf is an amazing success at least in part based on a craze for making astonishingly violent Nerf War videos and showing them to legions of fans on YouTube.

But that was Hasbro. Mattel was devoid of such success.

And Mattel had some failures too. The most notable one was American Girl an iconic up-market branded doll which Mattel took downmarket (stocking in Toys R Us) and blew up the cachet of the brand.

Once upon a time you could go with your precious daughter to an American Girl shop and have her clothed and her hair cut to match the doll. It was quite the experience. Stocking in mass market shops destroyed this.

What Mattel did have however was buybacks. Lots and lots of buybacks and they kept the earnings per share on a pleasant enough path. 

Mattel's buybacks

The extraordinary buyback binge undertaken by Mattel is best seen in their cashflow statement. If you want the full version I have prepared Mattel's accounts for over 20 years, standardised and as presented (courtesy of the wonderful CapitalIQ.com).

Here however is the key summary of the last few years of this binge:

YearBuybacks ($M)
2010447
2011524
201267
2013493
2014177


The buybacks (plus ordinary dividends) were way in excess of available cash generated and Mattel accumulated a lot of debt.

The credit rating is now firmly in "junk" territory and is trading (slightly) distressed. The debt trades in the low 90s.

There are now no buybacks now or dividends as cash flow has evaporated.

It is hard to imagine that Mattel, owners of such staples as Barbie, could get itself so knotted, but net debt is now over $2.2 billion. And when there hasn't been a lick of operating cash flow for two years that becomes difficult.

And even Barbie is a little problematic these days. Comparing Barbie to other dolls on Amazon reveals a lack of pricing power. Indeed it seems the only place with pricing power is the collectables market (and with Barbie that means really creepy forty five year old men).

Why I am short Mattel

I am short Mattel based on seemingly dysfunctional management and too much debt. I regarded these in part as flip sides of the same problem. Too much debt meant that Mattel found it hard to take risks, to invent new toys, to hire and nurture the talent that keeps a toy company fresh.

Debt meant that Mattel had to "milk" brands, prioritising short-term cash for stock repurchase and eventually for interest payments. This led to cashing the iconic American Girl brand in for a short-term sugar hit when it was stocked in Toys R Us.

I knew management were dysfunctional. Churn in the c-suite proves it. But recent stories leave me reeling. Mattel have morphed into a truly evil company. One that kills babies.

Dead babies

The recent big news was that Mattel has recalled the Fisher-Price’s Rock ’n Play sleeper. The story is well told in the New York Times.

Here is the key quote:
When Fisher-Price agreed last week to recall all 4.7 million Rock ’n Plays on the market, it said it was not at fault for the more than 30 infant deaths the Consumer Product Safety Commission had linked to the sleeper. 
Instead, the company said the reported deaths stemmed from the sleeper’s being “used contrary to safety warnings and instructions” to buckle babies in with the harness and avoid putting other items in the sleeper. (The safety commission advises that it should not be used once children reach 3 months or show signs of being able to roll over.)
I want you to understand how twisted this is. The company knew babies were dying in this sleeper. But the company wasn't at fault - it was the parents who used the sleeper in ways that seem obvious if contrary to instructions.

The New York Times demonstrate that the ways people used the sleeper were consistent with Mattel's advertising/promotions but whatever. 

Parents bought this thing and their babies died.

And it wasn't one death. One death is an accident. At the second death you are probably wondering "is this a product design issue". At the third death if you are not having serious doubts then you probably lacking basic human morality.

But this was over thirty deaths. 

That is thirty families that held funerals for their baby.

I don't know what you say to parent number 17 whose child died well after it was patently obvious that this thing was killing babies.

One day I guess we will find out what Mattel will say to a jury.

But this is a moral failure truly extraordinary for a company whose key staff have to love children, understand children and design things to make children happy.

Understanding children and designing and marketing things to make children happy

But from what I hear that isn't what Mattel is about any more. Their management were once from fast moving consumer goods companies (really attuned to milking brands).

Now they are Silicon Valley/social media types (which Hasbro has shown with Nerf might be better), but they seem too focused on selling their existing characters to Hollywood. 

But Hatchimals (to pick a success from Spin Master) was a toy aimed at young children designed by someone with flair and a deep empathy with the young children who are the target market. 

An empathy and an understanding that seems lacking at Mattel.

The morality of short-selling

I am a short-seller, and sometimes I am betting things fail when I really hope (for society) that they survive.

I am short a very small amount of Tesla and strangely I hope I lose on that bet. Elon Musk has demonstrated that electric cars can be better than internal combustion engines. He has improved the world. I think his finances are a mess and he has other problems. But deep down I hope he succeeds. I feel slightly dirty betting against what is fundamentally a good thing.

And I felt a little dirty betting against Barbie too. After all what is wrong with a toy company?

But there is plenty wrong with this toy company. It kills babies. It fails the basic test of a toy company. 

And it will probably go bust too. And it will be deserved. The world will be a better place when the toy company which doesn't love children and doesn't design things to make them happy finally fails.

And maybe the next deadly toy won't stay on the market quite as long. And there will be less grieving parents because this thing has finally filed chapter 11.

I truly hope so.




John

Thursday, August 2, 2018

A quick comment on the Herbalife results

Herbalife reported after market.

There was a lot of noise. Margins in various markets fell. There is the usual Herbalife currency noise. 


But lets cut through all of that.

I don't particularly care in this case whether you believe that Herbalife is a scheme that rips people off on their sales or whether you believe (as I do) that Herbalife is a network whereby weight loss products are sold via community support.

At the end of the day profits will eventually follow the volumes of product they sell.

If they are crooked profits will follow volumes.


If Herbalife is (as I argue) a true social support network profits will still eventually follow volumes.

Herbalife has for as long as I know used a consistent measure of volume - the volume point. This is not an arbitrary measure of volume. It is the mechanism by which distributors are paid and which real cash moves. 

With a single exception this quarter and only in a trial way in Brazil and Mexico a volume point has an unchanged meaning for the last decade.  For example a small tin of Formula 1, their main product and the largest selling diet shake in the world, is 23.95 volume points. It has been 23.95 volume points unchanged for decades.


The price of the product changes, but the number of volume points does not change. Changes in volume points are real changes. When volume points fell as the company implemented the changes demanded by the Federal Trade Commission those were real falls in volume.

And when volumes rose this quarter they were also real changes in volume. If they increase price revenue will grow even faster. 


Here is the volume points by sector this quarter versus the previous corresponding quarter.



 
Three Months Ended


Six Months Ended



June 30,
2018


June 30,
2017


% Change


June 30,
2018


June 30,
2017


% Change



(Volume Points in millions)

North America


336.4



284.1



18.4
%


639.6



586.7



9.0
%
Mexico(1)


237.1



228.9



3.6
%


458.9



454.4



1.0
%
South & Central America(2)


136.3



137.5



(0.9
)%


284.8



290.7



(2.0
)%
EMEA


319.5



283.6



12.7
%


614.2



557.8



10.1
%
Asia Pacific


302.8



275.9



9.7
%


589.4



536.7



9.8
%
China


196.1



153.9



27.4
%


337.2



335.9



0.4
%
Worldwide(3)


1,528.2



1,363.9



12.0
%


2,924.1



2,762.2



5.9
%



You see the highlighted things right. Volume points rose 12.7 percent this month in Europe, Middle East and Africa, 18.4 percent in North America and 27.4 percent in China.

This is an acceleration in growth. 

Now there are a couple of anomalies here. Firstly the United States (by far the bulk of the the North America segment) is lapping the particularly bad quarter when the company implemented the reforms the Federal Trade Commission demanded. China is lapping a strange quarter. Herbalife raised prices in March 2017 and volume points were particularly high in the first quarter of 2017 and low in the second quarter as customers bought purchases forward to beat the price rise.

But even without these anomalies Herbalife volume growth accelerated. A lot.

Now I say this because even if you believe Bill Ackman's thesis it is not a good stock to be short. Earnings growth is coming. And regulatory problems have passed.

--

But for a true Herbalife bull these results are even sweeter. 

Herbalife was made to change its operating rules in North America by the Federal Trade Commission. These rule changes ensure that Herbalife distributors can identify ultimate and real consumers for their product. Mostly the product is UPS direct from Herbalife to the identified ultimate distributor. Alternatively you go into a club and your name is taken. 

If the Bill Ackman case were correct (even in any substantial part) this would mean that Herbalife sales would collapse because Mr Ackman argued there were no ultimate customers and inability to identify them would make sales go away.

There was comment after comment from short-sellers arguing this and noting this quarter was going to be even harder as certain changes had to be fully implemented this quarter.

18.4 percent growth and record volumes in North America confirm what I knew - the vast bulk of Herbalife's sales are legitimate sales of diet products sold with community support networks to help people stick to their diet.

Herbalife remains an ethical company selling a product for which there is a real need.

And now it is a growth stock to boot - with very high incremental returns and a PE way below the market average.

All aboard. 




John

PS. My long post - the detailed background to the Herbalife story - is standing the test of time.

General disclaimer

The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Mr. Hempton. You should assume Mr. Hempton and his affiliates have positions in the securities discussed in this blog, and such beneficial ownership can create a conflict of interest regarding the objectivity of this blog. Statements in the blog are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and other factors. Certain information in this blog concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from information provided by third-party sources. Mr. Hempton does not guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. Such information may change after it is posted and Mr. Hempton is not obligated to, and may not, update it. The commentary in this blog in no way constitutes a solicitation of business, an offer of a security or a solicitation to purchase a security, or investment advice. In fact, it should not be relied upon in making investment decisions, ever. It is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author. In particular this blog is not directed for investment purposes at US Persons.