Saturday, November 8, 2008

AIG - thy name is opaque

I have been thinking about playing in the common securities  of AIG.  My view is that an awful lot of CDOs (and their CDS) are trading at levels way below where they will eventually settle.  [Illiquid markets and inability to borrow etc.]

In that case AIG common may be a good bet - because the collateral posted for future losses will be in part returned.

Then along comes this story (hat-tip to Felix) that AIG is lobbying hard to get the interest payments on the government loan reduced.  This suggests further liquidity problems.

I think I will leave that one in the "too hard basket" at least for a while.

John

Friday, November 7, 2008

The Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner lets Ambac have its 3 billion

Thanks to "anonymous" pointing it out in the comments.  Here is the release from the commissioner...


I suspect Ambac is - again - a reasonable speculative bet.

Am I going back?  Need to think about it for a few days...

J

Thursday, November 6, 2008

Berkshire Credit Default Swaps

I am quite familiar with Berkshire - about as familiar as you can get by reading stat statements and the like.

I can not blow it up.  That means I know of no reason whatsoever that it could wind up insolvent in five years.  

That does not mean it can not happen.  If 9.11 had been nuclear they might have had problems - but as my "Risk Aversion Berkshire Style" post makes clear fat tail risk is not part of the formula.  

So why is the five year credit default swap spread on Berkshire over 200bps?  I have no idea and it makes no sense to me.  

Maybe it is just irrational bearishness about everthing (ie BUY HARD) or maybe there is something I do not know.

So if anyone wants to post/reply a case for Berkshire CDS please...



John Hempton

Ambac: A surprisingly liquid after-market

Ambac looks like toast.  The downgrade gives them a massive and immediate liquidity call - and whilst I believe the insurance company will be ultimately solvent I express no such thing about the parent company.

I believe it is in the interests of the insurance commissioner to let money out of the insurance company to bail out the holding company.  But I have no assurance that the commissioner would do such a thing.

I sold - the last of my holding in the after-market.

The after-market was VERY liquid.  Surprisingly so.  So much so I am wondering whether someone knew more than me...

I guess I find out tonight my time.




John Hempton

My number 2 blowup

Moodys has cut Ambac's rating to a level that triggers the GIGs to pay and hence causes a liquidity event.

The liquidity event can be prevented by the insurance commissioner who might yet come to the party (and I think should in the interest of his policy holders).  But if the insurance commission does not come to the party Ambac will file bankruptcy.


J

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Walmart: Where is a statistician when you need one?

Extracted from the shareholder letter of the last Walmart annual report:

Improving Customer Experience
We continue to invest in improving the customer experience in our stores - faster checkouts, friendlier service and cleaner premises. Our customers are taking  note.  We survey almost two million customers every quarter, and they 
are validating the improvements.

I couldn't fathom this.  Surveying nearly 8 million people per year means that Walmart has a better handle on what the population wants that just about anyone.  

But somewhere I learnt the central limit theorem and the law of large numbers suggests that you don't obviously need to survey that many people unless you are dealing with very fine nuances...  

So please dear readers - what is Walmart doing here?  And why does it give them a competitive advantage?



John Hempton

PS.  If Walmart were a political party surveying that many people I would think were push polling.  It is not that - so what is it?

Friday, October 31, 2008

It is surprising how few people got the joke...

The hedge fund trade was long Porsche, short Volkswagen.  

Porsche after all owns many times its market cap in VW shares so the trade was obvious...

This has been a disastrous trade.  Plenty of hedge funds got hurt bad.  Most of them are still long Porsche.

When I suggested the only responsible trade was short Porshe I was teasing.  A serious tease because Porshe is playing with fire and there are ways that Porsche could go bust.  But it is not a position I would put on.  

Calling it "the only responsible trade" was a tease.  Pure and simple...

Sorry if it did not translate to print.




John Hempton

Wednesday, October 29, 2008

The only responsible trade...

Warning – I strongly recommend against trading in any security mentioned in this post. The volatility is enormous and the situation fluid. The stocks are not being driven by fundamentals… The recommendations in this post are made in a somewhat humorous manner. They might even be reckless...

I am horrified - despite this warning at least one person has thought that the trade should be placed. Please take this warning seriously. I have no position.


The Stutz Motor Car Company


There was once a fine American sports car company called Stutz. It made beautiful – even legendary cars. The cars had a reputation for dependability, reliability and punishing speed. I know they look antique – but these were really quick for their day – and they won big races like Indianapolis and the Le Mans 24 hour race. Le Mans (at least) is an event that Porsche likes to win. Here is their 1913 Stutz Bearcat – a car that was modified, overpowered etc and won races into the mid 1920s.



Anyway Stutz was controlled by Alan Aloysius Ryan through family holdings. For reasons mostly to do with improved mass production by competitors the company found itself under pressure. Short sellers could smell blood. And they shorted the stock. And shorted some more.


Through this Alan Aloysius Ryan stood firm, buying stock when he could (possibly through options and hidden holding companies so the shorts could not see what he had done). He did this until he declared one day in 1920 that he owned 105 percent of the company and the shorts could settle with him on his terms.


His terms were a price so high that it would bankrupt broker dealers who had stood as intermediaries between the stock exchange and shorts.


Well to put it bluntly the financial market and regulators defended their own. The story is told here and here and here and here in the New York Times – and the amounts of money involved were monstrous for the time. Eventually the New York Stock Exchange –with the threat of criminal proceedings – arbitrarily determined a price to settle the short positions. The shorts even got an officially sanctioned “protective committee”.


That price was way below the top price that Ryan paid – but far more than intrinsic value. The shorts – well – except those that shorted right at the end – lost money. Ryan wound up paying too much for a motor car company which was slowly declining anyway. As he now owned 100 percent of Stutz his debts got intertwined with the car company and both he and the car company went bust. Some family members got a little out but only by suing other family members. The only winners were ordinary longs of Stutz who sold along the way – or even at the final settlement price.


As you might have guessed this looks horribly familiar. Porsche is now firmly in control of Volkswagen – and they did it with non-standard cash settled options and other things they argue that they did not need to disclose. It looks and smells like market manipulation – and Volkswagen – General Motors for Europe – may be - depending on the time of day - the biggest company in the world by market cap. [Yes – its market cap is higher than Microsoft, Exxon or PetroChina.] This is the short-squeeze from hell – the first short-squeeze to infinity since the Stutz corner…


Now I think Porsche is one of the great businesses of the world. They have convinced middle aged richer Americans that they are more attractive – or at least more fun – if they drive that particular fast car. (Viagra is for poorer guys…)


And unlike Ferrari (which spends all of its profits on Formula One) Porsche – like Stutz before it – managed to make its mark with near-production cars in events like Le Mans. In the automobile world there are only two car companies with margins near 10 percent – Porsche and Toyota. And they got there different ways.


Porsche (the business) is having a rough time at the moment because if you haven’t noticed the willingness of middle aged American men to drop 100K on a car is somewhat reduced of late. But that might be temporary.


Porsche is a company I want to love – a very fine consumer brands company masquerading as an automobile company. And it is not expensive at the moment – especially if you back out their holding of Volkswagen. Indeed its holding of Volkswagen is worth many times Porsche’s market cap – making Porsche one of the cheapest stocks in the world.


But if history is a guide the Porsche and its controlling family are going to go the way of the Ryans. Their behaviour doesn’t look any more criminal than Alan Aloysius Ryan – and that wound up with him – and his company bankrupt. The system has a knack of defending itself – and the family that controls Porsche and indeed the Porsche company itself is every bit as expendable as Alan A Ryan.


I started this post with a warning – which was that nobody should play any security involved in this story – and I want to stick with this warning. But if you want to play – and it pains me to say this – the only responsible trade is to short Porsche. Porsche – the company – and possibly the car – like Stutz before it – will likely get confined to the dustbin of history.


This is a sad thing – because Porsche – as I have noted – is a nicely run and profitable company. But the appearance of criminal market manipulation will have consequences – and Porsche will pay the piper. My guess – some hapless European investment bank (say Fortis or UBS) is at risk in this – the greatest squeeze since Stutz – and the European court when forced to decide between a mid-ranking German car company and a bank that is integrated with a European government they will chose the bank at Porsche’s expense.


Porsche lovers can however console themselves if they are going to live another 40 years. Someone made some pug-ugly cars under the name of the “New Stutz Company” in the 1960s. Elvis Presley loved his. A small consolation – but the name lives on well after any family legacy is gone.




John Hempton


PS. Having spent some time the other day slamming the New York Times I would thank them for making available – for free no less – the original newspaper articles about the Stutz Corner.

Monday, October 27, 2008

Is the New York Times giving us a bad read on the newspaper business?

News Corp’s newspaper advert numbers are bad – but they are not catastrophic.  They have got markedly weaker very recently – but until then they were down single digit percentages – and low single digits in most papers.  Some were up - but they were local property papers and the like.  The death of newspapers looked exaggerated if your benchmark was News Corp.

The WSJ is doing OK- not stellar – but OK.  Murdoch clearly has plans to turn it (a) into a national paper, and (b) into the dominant paper in NYC.  In that he is helped by the seeming failures of the New York Times.   

The New York Times is a paper I want to like,  but in fact like less and less.  It is falling into catastrophic disrepair and the stock price shows it.

The New York Times has become the poster boy for the demise of newspapers everywhere.  Revenue and profitability is weak – and the paper looks doomed.

Well is it possible – just possible – that the NYT editorial policies are giving us all a false read about the demise of papers?  

  • Why is it that the paper employs Ben Stein despite the regular and ludicrous columns so well criticised by Felix Salmon?

  • Does anybody still read Maureen Dowd?  As far as I can tell the same incoherent column has been repeated for about a decade.  (Maybe I am just insensitive to "gender issues"?)  Is this worth a regular editorial column in what purports to be the world’s greatest paper?

  • Bob Herbert suits my liberal predisposition – but I don’t bother reading him because I learn little new or useful.  He is too predictable.  And he has been that predictable for fifteen years...

  • Friedman seems to know less about foreign affairs (outside Israel and Beirut) than I do.  And I know very little.  He has been spectacularly wrong quite often.  Unlike Friedman though I know I know little about foreign affairs - he has a platform to show off his ignorance twice a week...

  • David Brooks is a poor replacement for the conservative William Safire.  Safire wrote better – and more to the point I had little idea what he was going to say and sometimes I was forced by sheer power of argument to agree with him.  David Brooks has never done that for me.  Safire was a disingenous guy who twisted facts to suit his political views - but he was darn clever about how he did it...

  • In the editorial area all they have is the very clever Krugman.  I agree with Krugman a good proprotion of the time - but I am forced to think.  He drives conservatives to apoplexy for the same reasons that Safire drove liberals to apoplexy.  He is too darn good.  Unlike Safire he doesn't twist the facts - at least in my view.  If only the paper could find five writers the standard of Krugman covering most political persuasons.  But then it would need to sack the others!

And that is when I get to the editorial policy.  Need I repeat that this was the paper that employed Jayson Blair (who just made it up with little consequence for the world) and Judith Miller (whose seemingly made up stories helped propel America to the Iraq war). 

The New York Times is failing – and the newspaper is failing. 

In the past the New York Times would be forgiven their failures – because there were few alternative sources of information.  But now there are plenty… competition is rife.

Competition is seldom good for shareholders.  It hurts well run businesses but competition has a knack of totally disposing of badly run businesses.  Indeed that is the real charm of competition. 

I want to ask a question: how much of the awful results of the New York Times are because of the demise of newspapers generally – and how much are newspaper specific?  How would we know?  

 

 

John Hempton


PS.  Rupert Murdoch would tell you that ultimately content is all that matters.  It suits his business mix to say that.  But maybe there is far more to this than the internet causing destruction...

Buffett by comparison is fairly bearish about the newspaper Berkshire owns.

Thursday, October 23, 2008

A new disclosure "Magically" appears

In August – which in this market seems like years ago – I did two posts on MGIC  – the largest mortgage insurer and a company colloquially known as Magic. 

These posts are here and here

I concluded that I did not believe in Magic – but I outlined the bull case (which was that the companies had something close to positive cash flow) and had a readers who tried to convince me that the bull case was right.  (I was and remain short.) 

In the second post I made an observation about statutory capital and possible shortages thereof. 

My further objection is that statutory capital deficiency happens way earlier than this - and stat capital deficiency will close the business as per TGIC.

It is an innocuous line – but two readers (both of whom I respect) followed me up on it – and one was sure that statutory capital was going to be adequate (he was long).  The other modelled it with brackets for his own uncertainty – and we thought that statutory capital might run short.

Anyway MGIC’s results contained a new disclosure on this issue:

Some states that regulate us have provisions that limit the risk-to-capital ratio of a mortgage guaranty insurance company to 25:1. If an insurance company’s risk-to-capital ratio exceeds the limit applicable in a state, it may be prohibited from writing new business in that state until its risk-to-capital ratio falls below the limit.

We believe that our 2006 and 2007 books of business will continue to generate material incurred and paid losses for a number of years. The ultimate amount of these losses will depend in part on the direction of home prices in California, Florida and other distressed markets, which in turn will be influenced by general economic conditions and other factors. Because we cannot predict future home prices or general economic conditions with confidence, we cannot predict with confidence what our ultimate losses will be on our 2006 and 2007 books. Depending on the extent of future losses, MGIC’s policy holders position could decline and its risk-to-capital could increase beyond the levels necessary to meet these regulatory requirements and this could occur before the end of 2009. As a result, we are considering options to obtain additional capital, which could occur through the sale of equity or debt securities and/or reinsurance.

That is slightly worse than the worst end of the models my readers created for me in August.

In other words it is bad out there.  And if you look its bad not in Magic’s subprime book (where the number of delinquent loans are up only a little in year – because the bad loans have been mostly foreclosed).  It is bad in the prime book (which is really a near-prime book).  Delinquent so called “prime loans” are the problem as they were when I wrote the original posts.  In that category the delinquency (by which they mean edge-of-default delinquency) has nearlydoubled and the loss per claim has also nearly doubled in the last 5 quarters…  [For those interested in actual loans – a year ago they had 11,700 subprime near default loans.  Now they have 12,700.  For “prime loans” the near default pool has risen from 36,700 to 71,100 loans.]

Anyway the disclosure about needing more capital is super-bad.  If the company is forced to stop writing business it will end nastily because the holding company is levered.  And I doubt very much it can raise capital now. 

The stock is down less than 50% in the past two months – so I can’t crow about the short.  (Plenty that is that levered is down more.)  But if the long investors can explain to me why they shouldn’t run for the exits right now I would appreciate it. 

There is also some disclosure that appeared far more prominently.  I looked for it before and it was in footnotes.  I know I should read the footnotes but…

Anyway it says more about Fannie and Freddie than it does about Magic.  It is a definition of “full documentation” that could only exist in the twenty first century mortgage industry:

In accordance with industry practice, loans approved by Government Sponsored Enterprise and other automated underwriting systems under “doc waiver” programs that do not require verification of borrower income are classified by us as “full documentation.”

 

General disclaimer

The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Mr. Hempton. You should assume Mr. Hempton and his affiliates have positions in the securities discussed in this blog, and such beneficial ownership can create a conflict of interest regarding the objectivity of this blog. Statements in the blog are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and other factors. Certain information in this blog concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from information provided by third-party sources. Mr. Hempton does not guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. Such information may change after it is posted and Mr. Hempton is not obligated to, and may not, update it. The commentary in this blog in no way constitutes a solicitation of business, an offer of a security or a solicitation to purchase a security, or investment advice. In fact, it should not be relied upon in making investment decisions, ever. It is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author. In particular this blog is not directed for investment purposes at US Persons.