So prima-facie the new loan was good news.
The stock however dropped almost 10 percent (and was briefly down more).
The loan terms are onerous and complicated and there are some bizarre disclosures in the attachments to the loan document.
The first bizarre thing about the loan is the disclosure as to how much is drawn immediately. Here it is:
The Credit Agreement provides for a $127,500,000 term loan facility, a ¥6,593,406,594 term loan facility and a $187,500,000 revolving credit facility, each with a term of five years. The term loan facilities were drawn in full on October 10, 2014, and $112,500,000 of the revolving credit facility was also drawn on October 10, 2014.
They immediately drew $127.5 million dollars of term loan, ¥6.59 billion and a further $112.5 million on the revolver. That is $309.4 million USD.
This is way more debt than they had at the end of the previous quarter. Here is the balance sheet from the last 10-Q.
June 30, 2014
|
December 31, 2013
| ||||
ASSETS
| |||||
Current assets:
| |||||
Cash and cash equivalents
|
$
|
219,501
|
$
|
525,153
| |
Current investments
|
14,227
|
21,974
| |||
Accounts receivable
|
41,712
|
68,652
| |||
Inventories, net
|
389,650
|
339,669
| |||
Prepaid expenses and other
|
180,957
|
162,886
| |||
846,047
|
1,118,334
| ||||
Property and equipment, net
|
429,332
|
396,042
| |||
Goodwill
|
112,446
|
112,446
| |||
Other intangible assets, net
|
79,258
|
83,168
| |||
Other assets
|
136,531
|
111,072
| |||
Total assets
|
$
|
1,603,614
|
$
|
1,821,062
| |
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
| |||||
Current liabilities:
| |||||
Accounts payable
|
$
|
35,836
|
$
|
82,684
| |
Accrued expenses
|
383,012
|
626,284
| |||
Current portion of debt
|
99,828
|
67,824
| |||
518,676
|
776,792
| ||||
Long-term debt
|
111,621
|
113,852
| |||
Other liabilities
|
81,559
|
71,799
| |||
Total liabilities
|
711,856
|
962,443
| |||
Commitments and contingencies (Note 9)
| |||||
Stockholders' equity:
| |||||
Class A common stock – 500 million shares authorized, $.001 par value, 90.6 million shares issued
|
91
|
91
| |||
Additional paid-in capital
|
410,440
|
397,383
| |||
Treasury stock, at cost – 31.3 million and 31.6 million shares, respectively
|
(844,615)
|
(826,904)
| |||
Accumulated other comprehensive loss
|
(42,284)
|
(46,228)
| |||
Retained earnings
|
1,368,126
|
1,334,277
| |||
891,758
|
858,619
| ||||
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity
|
$
|
1,603,614
|
$
|
1,821,062
|
In the last quarter they had $219.5 million in cash and another $14.2 million in current investments. Against this they had $99.8 million in current debt and another $111.6 million in long term debt.
Total debt was $211.4 and net debt was zero.
Despite this they drew $302 million at moderately high interest rates.
But it is worse than that... the old debt numbers included some debt in Japan and Korea. Some of that is being left in place as per the loan covenant. In quantity:
Debt
| ||||
Borrower
|
Lender
|
Currency
|
Amount
| |
Nu Skin Japan Co., Ltd.
|
Mizuho Bank
|
Japan Yen
|
1,000,000,000
| |
NSE Korea Ltd.
|
Shinhan Bank
|
US Dollar
|
20,000,000
| |
So now - suddenly - the company has $339.9 million in debt - way more than the $211.4 they used to have. The rise is inexplicable because their last accounts showed net cash.
The company has rapidly - and at what was to them a penal interest rate - borrowed a huge amount of money they didn't seem to need a quarter ago and when they had net cash.
And it can't be for an acquisition because the loan covenants prohibit that.
If you have any good idea what the sink-hole that absorbed this much cash is let me know. However if this cash were needed during the last quarter the whole thing is diabolical. Bluntly if it were needed the company is presumably and somehow massively loss making. I simply do not know how. I am a bear on this stock but that is worse than I would have dared to guess.
Two hypotheses:
(a) the company is secretly massively cash consumptive and we do not know (in which case short) or
(b) the company is drawing a huge amount of debt for which it has no obvious use and which it is prohibited to use for an acquisition [that might include buy-backs as discussed below].
But remember this: Nu Skin drew the revolvers. And it drew them hard. Drawing the revolvers has precedent. It is seldom something that makes credit providers happy. There may be a good explanation (truly). The market has not been provided with it.
Dividend restrictions
The Credit Agreement requires the Company to maintain a consolidated leverage ratio not exceeding 2.25 to 1.00 and a consolidated interest coverage ratio of no less than 3.00 to 1.00. The Credit Agreement also includes other covenants, including covenants that, subject to certain exceptions, restrict the ability of the Company and its subsidiaries (i) to create, incur, assume or permit to exist any liens, (ii) to incur additional indebtedness, (iii) to make investments and acquisitions, (iv) to enter into mergers, consolidations or similar transactions, (v) to make certain dispositions of assets, (vi) to make dividends, distributions and prepayments of certain indebtedness, (vii) to change the nature of the Company's business, (viii) to enter into certain transactions with affiliates, (ix) to enter into certain burdensome agreements, (x) to make certain amendments to certain agreements and organizational documents and (xi) to make certain accounting changes.
Indeed the loan documents allow the following use of proceeds:
Section 6.11. Use of Proceeds. Use the proceeds of the Credit Extensions (i) for working capital, capital expenditures, and other lawful corporate purposes, including (without limitation) investments, acquisitions, stock repurchases and dividends not prohibited by the Loan Documents and (ii) to consummate the RefinancingSo they may buy back stock and pay dividends provided they meet a fairly burdensome list of possible events of default.
An event of default is disastrous under the new documents because it involves immediate acceleration. You do not want immediate acceleration ever.
That said - and it is a clear positive for Nu Skin - the default based on trailing operating cash flow has been removed. As indicated in past blog posts Nu Skin is peculiar - it generates substantial earnings and huge negative operating cash flows. Nu Skin breaches its cash flow based covenants - and these have been removed.
The only explanation (that is not truly nasty) that I have for drawing the revolvers is a deep desire to use the cash (whilst it is available) to buy back stock. However given the nasty taste that drawing revolvers gives to credit providers this is an aggressive thing to do. [But it is possible. I am not dismissing it.]
Receiveables from offshore entities
The disclosure that caused most amazement amongst Nu Skin watchers was a disclosure at the back of the credit agreement about how much money their offshore subsidiaries own them. This is a list:
Intercompany Receivables
| |||
Nu Skin Enterprises United States, Inc.
| |||
Nu Skin Canada, Inc.
|
146,199
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc.
| |||
Nu Skin Enterprises New Zealand, Inc.
|
175,787
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Hong Kong, LLC
|
7,675,959
| ||
Nu Skin Japan Co., Ltd.
|
620,350
| ||
NSE Korea Ltd.
|
5,824,767
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Singapore, Pte. Ltd.
|
230,681
| ||
Nu Skin Israel, Inc.
|
165,000
| ||
Nu Skin Taiwan, LLC
|
1,363
| ||
Jixi Nu Skin Vitameal Co., Ltd.
|
430,500
| ||
Pharmanex (Huzhou) Health Products Co., Ltd.
|
5,432,400
| ||
NSE Asia Products, Pte. Ltd.
|
8,035,931
| ||
Nu Skin International, Inc.
| |||
Nu Skin International Management Group, Inc.
|
44,301,819
| ||
Nu Skin Mexico, S.A. de C.V
|
5,672,930
| ||
Nu Skin Guatemala, S.A.
|
3,488,701
| ||
Nu Skin El Salvador S. A. de C.V.
|
104,543
| ||
Nu Skin Honduras, S.A.
|
131,853
| ||
Nu Skin Costa Rica
|
377,841
| ||
Nu Skin Venezuela, C.A.
|
6,421,303
| ||
Nu Skin Colombia, Inc.
|
128,188
| ||
Nu Skin Argentina, Inc.
|
759,321
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises New Zealand, Inc.
|
436,748
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises (Thailand) Limited
|
627,077
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Philippines, LLC
|
159,190
| ||
Nu Skin (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.
|
1,321,469
| ||
Nu Skin Pharmanex (B) Sdn. Bhd.
|
30,366
| ||
Nu Skin Israel, Inc.
|
2,725,815
| ||
PT Nu Skin Distribution Indonesia
|
6,427,129
| ||
PT Nu Selaras Indonesia
|
924,291
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Viet Nam Limited Liability Company
|
520,580
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises RS, Ltd.
|
283,453
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises South Africa (Proprietary) Limited
|
1,163,340
| ||
Nu Skin (China) Daily-Use & Health Products Co., Ltd.
|
2,207,202
| ||
NSE Asia Products, Pte. Ltd.
|
53,477,483
| ||
NSE Products, Inc.
| |||
Nu Skin Netherlands, B.V.
|
86,794
| ||
Nu Skin Germany, GmbH
|
101,827
| ||
Nu Skin France, SARL
|
27,185
| ||
Nu Skin Italy, Srl
|
177,788
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprise SRL
|
12,164,682
| ||
Nu Skin Eastern Europe Ltd.
|
74,974
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Poland Sp. Z.o.o.
|
8,814
| ||
Nu Skin Turkey Cilt Bakimi Ve Besleyici Uranleri Ticarel Limited Sirketi
|
597,032
| ||
Nu Skin Islandi ehf.
|
849,996
| ||
Nu Skin Czech Republic, S.r.o.
|
217,724
| ||
Nu Skin Slovakia
|
98,394
| ||
Nu Skin Israel, Inc.
|
599,956
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises South Africa (Proprietary) Limited
|
71,231
| ||
Nu Skin International Management Group, Inc.
|
2,272,938
| ||
Nu Skin Mexico, S.A. de C.V
|
969,970
| ||
Nu Skin Guatemala, S.A.
|
960,774
| ||
Nu Skin El Salvador S. A. de C.V.
|
265
| ||
Nu Skin Costa Rica
|
2,194,916
| ||
Nu Skin Canada, Inc.
|
4,446,848
| ||
Nu Skin Venezuela, C.A.
|
23,896,815
| ||
Nu Skin Colombia, Inc.
|
7,811,575
| ||
Nu Skin Argentina, Inc.
|
414,677
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises New Zealand, Inc.
|
4,010,293
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Australia, Inc.
|
1,316,560
| ||
NSE Korea Ltd.
|
18,651,855
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Philippines, LLC
|
319,735
|
Nu Skin Enterprises Viet Nam Limited Liability Company
|
224,177
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises Ukraine, LLC
|
377,261
| ||
Nu Skin Enterprises RS, Ltd.
|
4,998,951
| ||
Nu Skin (China) Daily-Use & Health Products Co., Ltd.
|
133,465,866
| ||
NSE Asia Products, Pte. Ltd.
|
23,849,660
| ||
Total
|
405,689,111
| ||
The total is almost $406 million. This is large - about half the stockholders equity and the bulk of tangible stockholders equity.
If the foreign subsidiaries have the cash (and it is presumed they do) then they should - subject to payment restrictions - just pay it.
There is $24 million owed to head office by Venezuela. Good luck collecting that. But outside that the amounts should be collectable if the foreign subsidiaries are good for it. There is $133 million owed by China. This might be difficult to collect based on the amount of activity we have seen in China. However if they own the very large office complex we saw (see the post) they could collect some of it by selling up.
But the more pertinent question is why haven't all those subsidiaries been able to pay the money they owe to head office? Inquiring minds are asking. Especially as the company drew the revolvers.
--
Venezuela
The Venezuela amounts are irrelevant in Nu Skin (and Herbalife for that matter) but there is a contradiction between what the table above shows and the management says. According to recent presentation at the Wedbush conference they only had $10-15 million of sales in Venezuela.
It is hard to see how they are owed $24 million by a subsidiary that only has half that in sales. I can't square it. A clearer explanation of Venezuela exposure would be nice.
John
6 comments:
Leaving money offshore is not tax related?
Sir,
I am a big fan of your blog, and enjoy your unique take on individual stocks. I am a high yield analyst in the States, and very interested in studying changes in capital structures of heavily indebted issues of companies not under my coverage hoping this will shed light on actions taken my management teams that I follow.
Thus, I took great interest in your Nu Skin analysis, given the increased debt load is perplexing given the state of the company. I think the interesting question is not why they are borrowing more than they reportedly need, but why the banks are lending that amount? Also, how do those banks ensure protection? Here are just some quick overall thoughts:
· The new loan is essentially done to take out Pru. It is apparent the private lending side wants no more exposure to Nu Skin following the restrictive payments covenant violation. They entered into an amendment to avoid acceleration of the debt and allowed the dividends. But clearly this amendment was a short term arrangement until Pru could be taken out (see note 15 in last 10Q). In essence, the loan DID breach its covenants, and required a waiver. More important, Pru wanted out.
· I think your pro forma debt numbers are slightly off. As you stated, there is $309MM of new debt from the term loans. In note 15 of the 10-Q, it states that the company borrowed $50mm through the Japanese and Korean facility. So there should be $359mm outstanding.
· It looks like the company borrowed the $50mm from the two facilities to repay a $35MM payment on its 2010 term loan (listed at end of 2q).
· So, according to my math, the company raised $359mm of new debt (309+50) and paid off $211.5mm in debt and a $7.5mm termination fee to Pru for net $140mm net proceeds.
· From a birds-eye view, it seems strange Pru wants out. The overall leverage is not so bad $359mm debt/607mm ltm ebitda implies a 0.6x leverage ratio. For someone who regularly deals with 7x levered entities, I would think that’s a solid credit. So, your instincts that not all is right is the correct one.
· The collateral for the loan is interesting. It only includes domestic subs and 65% of the equity in foreign subsidiaries. Given that most of the sales are derived in foreign companies, it doesn’t seem like a lot. The company does not need to report condensed financials, so it’s not clear how much of the business sits outside the guarantee group. But we do know that approximately $206mm of $219mm in cash sits in foreign subs. Except for Venezuela, the company claims that most of this cash is readily convertible to cash and can be repatriated. We also know that China is a partial issue also. So could it be that the ability to repatriate cash to fund US ops, including dividends and share repurchases are complicated by the timing and potential leakage of taxes from repatriation. I think this has something to do with it.
· Attached is a quick analysis just looking at the components of FCF. It may be a little off but close. The Funds from operations foot (including working capital). What is interesting is that the entity has gone FCF negative mostly due to working capital changes. Something tells me the key is here. The payments out in 1H14 are well in excess of the buildup in all of 2013. Not sure why this is the case. But dividend restriction looks ok, so my sense is that the excess cash will be used for either working capital purposes and/or potential acquisitions.
In the end, I try to focus on cash flow and the movement of cash among subsidiaries, particularly where there can be restrictions. Large swings in working capital, while not an issue outright, needs to be understood. Further, I am always concerned about cash tied up in foreign subs that are needed to fund domestic cash needs.
Best of luck with your work.
JK
Sir,
I am a big fan of your blog, and enjoy your unique take on individual stocks. I am a high yield analyst in the States, and very interested in studying changes in capital structures of heavily indebted issues of companies not under my coverage hoping this will shed light on actions taken my management teams that I follow.
Thus, I took great interest in your Nu Skin analysis, given the increased debt load is perplexing given the state of the company. I think the interesting question is not why they are borrowing more than they reportedly need, but why the banks are lending that amount? Also, how do those banks ensure protection? Here are just some quick overall thoughts:
· The new loan is essentially done to take out Pru. It is apparent the private lending side wants no more exposure to Nu Skin following the restrictive payments covenant violation. They entered into an amendment to avoid acceleration of the debt and allowed the dividends. But clearly this amendment was a short term arrangement until Pru could be taken out (see note 15 in last 10Q). In essence, the loan DID breach its covenants, and required a waiver. More important, Pru wanted out.
· I think your pro forma debt numbers are slightly off. As you stated, there is $309MM of new debt from the term loans. In note 15 of the 10-Q, it states that the company borrowed $50mm through the Japanese and Korean facility. So there should be $359mm outstanding.
· It looks like the company borrowed the $50mm from the two facilities to repay a $35MM payment on its 2010 term loan (listed at end of 2q).
· So, according to my math, the company raised $359mm of new debt (309+50) and paid off $211.5mm in debt and a $7.5mm termination fee to Pru for net $140mm net proceeds.
· From a birds-eye view, it seems strange Pru wants out. The overall leverage is not so bad $359mm debt/607mm ltm ebitda implies a 0.6x leverage ratio. For someone who regularly deals with 7x levered entities, I would think that’s a solid credit. So, your instincts that not all is right is the correct one.
· The collateral for the loan is interesting. It only includes domestic subs and 65% of the equity in foreign subsidiaries. Given that most of the sales are derived in foreign companies, it doesn’t seem like a lot. The company does not need to report condensed financials, so it’s not clear how much of the business sits outside the guarantee group. But we do know that approximately $206mm of $219mm in cash sits in foreign subs. Except for Venezuela, the company claims that most of this cash is readily convertible to cash and can be repatriated. We also know that China is a partial issue also. So could it be that the ability to repatriate cash to fund US ops, including dividends and share repurchases are complicated by the timing and potential leakage of taxes from repatriation. I think this has something to do with it.
· Attached is a quick analysis just looking at the components of FCF. It may be a little off but close. The Funds from operations foot (including working capital). What is interesting is that the entity has gone FCF negative mostly due to working capital changes. Something tells me the key is here. The payments out in 1H14 are well in excess of the buildup in all of 2013. Not sure why this is the case. But dividend restriction looks ok, so my sense is that the excess cash will be used for either working capital purposes and/or potential acquisitions.
In the end, I try to focus on cash flow and the movement of cash among subsidiaries, particularly where there can be restrictions. Large swings in working capital, while not an issue outright, needs to be understood. Further, I am always concerned about cash tied up in foreign subs that are needed to fund domestic cash needs.
Best of luck with your work.
JK
John, perhaps all the NUS cash is held outside of US and cannot be brought onshore without a tax hit (US tax code hits repatriated cash)....the US operation may need cash and hence the heavy borrowing
John - thanks for writing up your thoughts on the NUS refi; I also found it perplexing. Great find on the intercompany receivables. My hypothesis (which you alluded to and perhaps considered without explicitly stating): the net increase in debt - about $120mm - is most all the amount the China sub owes head office ($133mm); company management cannot access that cash and so needs to replenish however they can, despite the poor optics on the immediate revolver drawdown.
The question, of course, is why can't they access the cash. This could be because the earnings (and cash generated) in China never existed, as you previously conjectured; or it could have been embezzled, etc. Either way I am struggling, like you, with how much cash this business supposedly consumed in the last couple of quarters...
Additional yellow flag (I guess not quite red but still concerning): long-time lenders JPM and Prudential were taken out in this refi (and aren't involved in the new lending facility that I can see)
Why not go long Nu Skin's travel agent as an offset to your short?
First, we had a significant amount of accrued expenses at the end of December 2013, following record sales and a record number of sales representatives who
qualified for incentive trips. The selling expenses and incentive trip expenses, although accrued in 2013, were paid in 2014.
This to your question where the money is going! As an aside, these must be quite the trips if one works out the cost (233m in H1 for how many representatives!?).
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