Tuesday, August 9, 2011
Paul Krugman vs Mr Bean
My post on margin calls is my second most visited post in the past year.
The most visited post however is Mr Bean declaring the European Debt Crisis over.
Krugman is super-smart, has a platform at the New York Times and at Princeton and has a Nobel prize.
But Rowan Atkinson pulls a bigger crowd and doesn't have to say anything.
John
Who has got the margin call?
And we are short the wildest range of frauds, fads and failures you can imagine.
Our shorts are small and relatively illiquid. They are also higher beta - so we tend to be 2-2.5 times as long as we are short and that is only mildly market correlated.
The strategy has been wildly profitable for the last six months and is not bad most the time but we do not like days when the market really pukes.
When the market really pukes it is the biggest, most liquid names that get sold. Why? Because you can sell them.
And they go down hardest. Which is problematic if you are long that which goes down hardest.
So today is not our strongest day - and whilst we are down far-less than market - I can't say I am enjoying it.
But I am fascinated.
You see the desperate selling of the biggest liquid names is a sign of margin calls.
The market is not puking. Some prime broker is puking the stocks held by one or more very large hedge funds.
So lets play the game: guess who got the margin call!
Guesses by email or in the comments...
John
Sunday, August 7, 2011
Are prospective expenditure matching funds in Trina Solar's debt covenants?
You can get an idea of the processes involved (but not the scale of the factory) with this YouTube promotional video:
They aim to be the largest maker of solar panels in the world.
This is a high profile company. It sponsors Formula 1 and Indy Car which gives the executives the chance to be filmed in front of fast cars surrounded by pretty young women.
My problem is that the more I look at the accounts the less I understand them.
To this end I wrote a letter to management suggesting that they were in (seemingly unnecessary) breach of their debt covenants and they wrote back assuring me they were not.
This post makes public my letter and their response. Some commentary is provided on their response.
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First my letter:
Attention Terry Wang, Chief Financial Officer, Trina Solar
by email: ***@trinasolar.com
Copied:
Thomas Young, Senior Director of Investor Relations
by email: ir@trinasolar.com
***
Puzzling over Trina's debt covenants
Dear Sirs
I am a hedge fund investor based in Australia. I am also the writer of the popular Bronte Capital blog. The blog has been associated with exposing Chinese accounting scandals but the companies discussed on the blog differ substantially from Trina Solar. Substantially they did not exist. Trina Solar clearly exists and Trina Solar panels are distributed widely.
I am increasingly puzzled over Trina Solar's accounts. The issue that puzzles me most is the high cash balance combined with strange debt covenants.
I intend on writing a blog post about this – and I seek your comments because it is almost certain there is a simple and innocent explanation of what I see and I am happy to include your response in my blog post. It is more an education in how a competent hedge fund manager reads accounts.
Anyway the issue I am raising is how Trina funds its capital expansion.
The last 20F filing contained the following investing cash flow section:
[Click for full detail...]
The columns are for 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. Purchase of property plant and equipment was 165, 136 and 144 million dollars for the three years respectively.
The 20F also contains this section about a debt facility to purchase the property, plant and equipment.
In September 2009, Trina China entered into a five-year credit facility of approximately $303.3 million, consisting of RMB1,524.6 million Renminbi denominated loan and $80.0 million U.S. dollar denominated loan, with a syndicate of five PRC banks led by the Agricultural Bank of China and Bank of China. Approximately $269.2 million of the facility are designated solely for the expansion of our production capacity, with the remaining to be used to supplement working capital requirements once the capacity expansion is completed. The facility can be drawn down either in Renminbi or U.S. dollars. As of December 31, 2010, we had drawn down approximately $275.1 million under the facility. The remaining facility to supplement working capital requirements can only be drawn on or after the date of completion of capacity expansion. The weighted average interest rate for borrowings under the facility was 5.53% for the year ended December 31, 2010. Interest is payable quarterly or biannually in arrears for loans denominated in Renminbi and U.S. Dollars, respectively. Interest rate applied for Renminbi-denominated borrowings is the same interest rate stipulated by Chinese central bank plus 10%. U.S.-dollar denominated borrowings are subject to the six-month London Interbank Offered Rate plus 3%. The facility is guaranteed by Trina and Mr. Jifan Gao, our chairman and chief executive officer, and his wife, Ms. Chunyan Wu, and is collateralized by the property, plant and equipment of the project and the related land-use right. Borrowings outstanding as of December 31, 2010 are payable on a biannual basis, commencing on October 27, 2011. For purposes of the expansion, we are required to match draw-downs from the facility with an equal amount of cash from sources other than the facility. The terms of facility also contain financial covenants which, among other things, require us to maintain a debt-asset ratio of no more than 0.60, a net profit ratio of not less than zero percent and an interest coverage ratio of greater than 2.At first reading this is very puzzling. This facility is “designated solely for the expansion of our production capacity, with the remaining to be used to supplement working capital requirements once the capacity expansion is completed.” However we know that Trina's purchases of property, plant and equipment were 144 million in 2010 and 136 million in the WHOLE of 2009.
They facility is drawn to 275 million. So it appears Trina has funded their entire 2009 and 2010 capex with this facility. However the terms state that Trina must “match draw-downs from the facility with an equal amount of cash from sources other than the facility”. It doesn't look possible that Trina has done that and it appears that Trina has drawn their bank facilities in excess of what the covenants would allow.
I have puzzled further over this – maybe some old property, plant and equipment debt was rolled into this facility. But according to the latest 20F filing the long-term borrowings outstanding at the end of 2008 were only $14.6 million so the strangely-large draw-down of this facility cannot be the result of long-term debt rollover.
So unless I am mistaken (and I would appreciate you telling me where I am mistaken) Trina has drawn this facility far in excess of what is allowed under the facility terms and is currently in breach of its debt covenants.
This is peculiar because Trina showed free cash in excess of $750 million on their balance sheet as per December 2010. There would appear no reason why Trina would be in breach of the debt covenant. Moreover it is a pretty harsh covenant – it involves a pledge of most the property of Trina and personal guarantees by Mr Jifan Gao and his wife.
Anywhere but China I would consider this as an innocent mistake – one easily fixed by taking cash from the balance sheet and making good on the 50 percent rule. In China you have to question cash balances. I have spotted other companies with fake cash balances. But those were substantially fake companies and Trina is clearly a very large manufacturing concern.
So – I am writing to ask (a) whether my analysis is fundamentally wrong and if it is not (b) why are you in breach of your debt covenants, (c) how much of the cash on-balance-sheet will be used to make good that breach, (d) have you sought a waiver of those covenants and (e) whether that waiver has been made good.
I hope to hear your answer.
I intend on blogging on this in about five days – and I will incorporate your answers in the blog post.
Thanks in advance.
John Hempton
Now their response:
Senior Director, Investor Relations
Commentary:
I showed both the letter and the response to one of my better friends (someone highly familiar with the nuance of debt covenants) and he drolly replied that "prospective expenditures are not exactly matching funds".
The usual notion of "matching funds" is that if you spend $100 on plant and equipment the loan may be drawn to $50 and the other $50 has to come from somewhere else.
According to the company the loan is drawn to $275.1 million as of year end and Mr Young tells me the project is not finished. $275.1 million is way in excess of half of capital expenditure in 2009 and 2010.
Trina Solar say that some 2008 capital expenditures should also be included. The total investment in property, plant and equipment in three years 2008, 2009 and 2010 was (165 plus 136 plus 144 million equal to) 445 million. If they had only drawn the loan to 50 percent of the last three year's capex they would have only drawn 222.5 million rather than the above-mentioned 275.1 million.
Trina tell us that they can match funds with future expenditures. I find that unusual but as this blog is a fan of Fox News I will answer with the usual rejoinder: I report. You decide.
John
Post script: I think Jeffrey Rothstein's comment below - and my reply to it - are important parts of this story - so I encourage reading of the comments. I am not sure the 20F filing disclosure accurately reflects terms of the loan agreement.
Thursday, August 4, 2011
So that makes it alright then...
That mantle has now shifted to Harbin Electric a company which makes (or is that purports to make) large numbers of high-tech electric motors. The Harbin battle has become special for its vitriol and today's 15% plunge and recovery in the stock is just the latest salvo.
Harbin Electric is subject to a proposed management buyout involving the CEO (Mr Tianfu Yang) and Abax Capital (an Asian based private equity fund sometimes associated with Morgan Stanley). The proposed buyout price is $24 and the stock is trading at $17.50 so if the deal goes through holders should make 37% returns. As the deal is meant to close in three months this is an unbelievable 350 percent annualized return. Bulls point to reputable parties involved in this deal including Goldman Sachs and China Development Bank.
Citron's case is that the company is a fraud and the deal is a fraud. The company is worth something close to zero, the deal will not close and the stock will collapse to low single digits. Citron (and other shortsellers) argue the deal is a ruse to suck in unsuspecting arb funds and dumb shareholders and that - absent the deal - Harbin would have collapsed like just about every other Chinese reverse merger.
I am not going to go through the background: all I want to point to is the latest "hit-piece" from Citron Research and Harbin's response.
Harbin alleges criminal behavior by people associated with Citron:
The Company believes that Citron used doctored SAIC reports. The Company has recently reconciled its PRC tax filings on a consolidated basis with its financial statements reported in its SEC filings for fiscal year 2009 and has not found any inconsistency in any material respect. Its SAIC filings are largely in line with its tax filings in the PRC.
Mr. Plowman is both head of the audit committee of Harbin, as well as the appointed head of the special committee to take the company private. This committee is at the center of the requirement that the interests of shareholders be defended. It is under his watch that we are to trust both Harbin’s financials, and the fairness of the process by which the “takeover” transaction proceeds.
However, the July 13, 2011 proxy statement filing is the first time investors are informed of the following :
- “Shortly after Abax filed a Schedule 13G with the SEC on December 9, 2010 announcing its greater than 5% ownership of the Company common stock, Mr. Plowman, the Special Committee Chair, brought to the attention of the other members of Special Committee, as well as to Gibson Dunn, the fact that he was then serving as a director of several Abax-controlled entities including Abax Global Opportunities Fund, Abax Arhat Fund, Abax Claremont Ltd., Abax Jade Ltd., Abax Emerald Ltd., Abax Lotus Ltd., Abax Nai Xin A Ltd., and Abax Nai Xin B Ltd. (the “Abax Companies”).”
The allegation that Mr. Boyd Plowman is a Director of Abax is simply not correct. Mr. Plowman resigned as a Director of Abax on December 16, 2010, just a few days after Abax acquired 5% of the Company on December 9, 2010. This information has been disclosed in the preliminary proxy statement filed with SEC on July 13, 2011. Mr. Boyd Plowman confirm that he is not a director of Kilometre Growth either as alleged by the Report.
That is 216 days.
On July 28, 2010, the Company entered into a Loan Agreement, dated July 28, 2010 (the “Loan Agreement”) with Abax Emerald Ltd., a Cayman Islands limited company (“Abax”), pursuant to which Abax agreed to provide the Company with up to $15,000,000 in loans (“Abax Loan”). The Abax Loan was to be made pursuant to one or more borrowings (each, an “Advance”) from time to time from the Closing Date (July 28, 2010) to the date falling on the expiration of five (5) months after the Closing Date upon delivering a notice from us to Abax. In lieu of payment of interest in cash on each Advance, the outstanding principal amount thereof accreted in value for the period commencing on the Borrowing Date (the date on which any Advance is made from us to Abax) for such Advance and ending on the day on which such Advance is repaid, at a rate equal to 10% per annum, computed as described in the Agreement. The Loan Agreement provided that we could voluntarily prepay any Advance (or portion thereof in an integral multiple of $100,000) at its accreted value at any time upon written notice to Abax. On the Maturity Date (six months after the date of the Agreement), we were obligated to repay the remaining outstanding loan not theretofore paid, together with all fees and other amounts payable under the Loan. On July 29, 2010, the Company received the $15 million loan from Abax. The Abax Loan was used to pay down certain debt and to support our capital expenditures and working capital.
And Harbin disclosed the fact that it was a related party 216 days after management were informed of the conflict. And they did not disclose it in the 10K.
Thursday, July 28, 2011
Wage inflation in Australia (POST NOW WITHDRAWN)
http://www.seek.com.au/Job/shotfirer/in/rockhampton-capricorn-coast-rockhampton-capricorn-coast/20196165
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So the typo theory is clearly correct.
John
PS - I am regularly hearing of 300K for skilled mining jobs. Four times that startled me which is why the post.
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This is a recent Australian job advert. Rockhampton region - which means the Southern end of the Great Barrier Reef or a short drive from Airlie Beach where it is warm and the sun shines 300 plus days a year.
7 days on, 7 days off. Must be good with explosives.
Salary: AUD1.2 million plus bonus. That is USD1.32 million.
Anyone think they picked the wrong career?
John
Google Plus thinks I am a social climber...
Here - with only minor editing - are five consecutive suggestions made to me:
You see this right. Three of them are Larry Page, Sergey Brin and Mark Zuckerberg in order.
I know none of these people though Zuckerberg shares a single Facebook friend with me and I know someone who was in his computer science classes at Harvard.
Google + is getting users fast - and I find myself looking at Facebook much less - but is the appeal of Google + the asymmetric friending process where I can add people like this to my "circles" and pretend that I am far better connected and far more upwardly mobile than in reality?
For comment.
John
PS. Does anyone else think it is strange that Zuckerberg winds up in my Google + suggested circle so fast?
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
General disclaimer
The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Mr. Hempton. You should assume Mr. Hempton and his affiliates have positions in the securities discussed in this blog, and such beneficial ownership can create a conflict of interest regarding the objectivity of this blog. Statements in the blog are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and other factors. Certain information in this blog concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from information provided by third-party sources. Mr. Hempton does not guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. Such information may change after it is posted and Mr. Hempton is not obligated to, and may not, update it. The commentary in this blog in no way constitutes a solicitation of business, an offer of a security or a solicitation to purchase a security, or investment advice. In fact, it should not be relied upon in making investment decisions, ever. It is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author. In particular this blog is not directed for investment purposes at US Persons.


