The peculiarity of Fannie and Freddie’s market cap

This post is deleted. It is wrong.

I much appreciate people indicating mistakes. I am kind of embarrased about that one...

J

Deflation and bank bailouts in Japan

Given what is happening with Fannie Mae at the moment I should share a little of the history of non-US bank bail outs. I will start with Japan and later do Scandinavia.

Japan was an unusual bank collapse. It happened despite excess savings in the system. This is really strange. Most bank collapses happen when there is a lending binge that drives excess or investment or consumption and with a current account deficit. (See for instance Korea – where there was excess investment or Argentina where there was excess consumption.)

Japanese banks always had (at least collectively) sufficient deposits. [See my post on 77 Bank to see just how much excess deposits they now have.]

But the Japanese banks lent very badly indeed. Part of this lending was to the "Zombie companies" but most was on property. The formalised golf-club membership exchange in Japan at one stage was worth a good multiple of the entire Australian stock exchange (including giants such as BHP and Conzinc Rio Australia). Golf club memberships were of course a pure-play method of speculating on land.

But you need to notice that the Japanese bank collapse looked very different from what is going on in America now. The Japanese bank collapse was not a collapse of funding – it was a collapse of asset values and solvency. [Exceptions noted.]

American financial institutions are now having wholesale funding runs (or finding wholesale funding is unavailable which amounts to the same thing). Japanese financial institutions did not need wholesale funding (most had deposits) and hence by-and-large did not have runs. [There were some institutions such as the long-term-credit banks and similar institutions which had wholesale funding – they were effectively nationalised.]

Many Japanese regional banks (Nishi Nippon for example) were breathtakingly insolvent at the height of the crisis but they remained liquid because they had plenty of deposits. Because they remained liquid they never actually failed.

The zero interest rate policy

Insolvent but liquid banks are the key to understanding Japanese interest rate policy. There are several prominent macroeconomists in America (led notably by Krugman but joined by Bernanke) who argue that the zero interest rate policy was insufficiently expansionary – and that monetary policy should have been eased until it induced inflation. In theory this could be done by flying a helicopter over Tokyo throwing out freshly printed 5 thousand yen notes. Indeed it was in a speech about Japan that Bernanke uttered the famous helicopter line.

The BOJ always thought this policy was “risky”. Krugman’s response was that it was less risky that the endless government deficits Japan ran. Krugman missed the point – the question was who was inflation risky for? My answer: the banks.

A hypothetical insolvent bank

Imagine a hypothetical insolvent bank. Suppose the bank has 90 in funding, 10 in “stated equity” and “stated” 100 in assets. [I have left the currency blank because this could be 100s of billions of yen or billions of dollars.]

And suppose that the assets are not really 100 but 70 good and 30 bad - and everyone knows about the bad assets.

Then the bank “really” has 70 in assets, 90 in funding and minus 20 in equity. This is a realistic picture of insolvent Japan in 1994.

If the bank was in a current account deficit country like America, Australia, New Zealand or the UK there would be an immediate problem. In a wholesale funded market the 90 in funding would be say 60 of deposits and 30 of wholesale funds – and the wholesale funding would leave. The bank would go insolvent quite rapidly (see Northern Rock which was very reliant on wholesale funding).

But in Japan the 90 in funding was all deposits and was sticky. The funding never left and the bank continued quite nicely. Capital market discipline was not imposed – and the hypothetical bank could pretend there was no problem for many years. Banks fold when they go illiquid - not when they go insolvent. No liquidity problem means no crisis.

But the problem is still real. Over time insolvency may turn into illiquidity.

Now suppose that (and this is a gross simplification) that the spread between deposit rates was 2%. But rates could either be 10 and 12 percent or 0 and 2 percent.

If the rates were 10% and 12% the 90 of funding would cost 9 per year. The 70 of “real” assets would yield 8.4 per year. The bank would be cash flow negative. Anything that is cash flow negative for long enough goes illiquid eventually. The insolvency problem would turn into a liquidity problem.

Now suppose the rates were 0% and 2%. The 90 in funding is free. The 70 in assets yields 1.4%. The same banks is cash flow positive in a low interest rate environment. If they are cash flow positive for 15 years the bank will fully recapitalise.

• Summary: zero interest rates were critical to bank recapitalisation in Japan.

The reason why the BOJ rejected the Krugman/Bernanke line was that it was risky to the banks and the BOJ (and the MOF) are totally captured by their bank constituency. It was risky not to the economy but to banks. [Note the practice of amakudari translated as “descent from heaven” where former government officials get to be CEO of banks late in their career.]

Why this form of bailout won’t happen in America

In America it is the wholesale funded institutions that are in the most trouble. Think Bear Stearns, Lehman, Fannie, Freddie.

They are in diabolical trouble.

The funding is leaving them. It does not matter whether rates are 0 or 10 – the funding is still going.

America will look far more like Scandinavia than Japan. Scandinavia was a funding crisis. The posts by Naked Capitalism and others suggesting that Japan’s wasted decade will be the new normal are just plan wrong.

Implications

I still have not worked out what side of the inflation/deflation divide I am. But the people that point to Japan as a likely outcome miss a point. Japan chose deflation because the alternative was nationalising the banks.

America does not have that choice. The American institutions are wholesale funded and hence will nationalised or fail if the wholesale funding disappears.

Nationalisation can be inflationary if it involves printing. The date the Federal Reserve is not printing – but Helicopter Ben has made clear that in Japan the BOJ should have printed. And the institutional imperative to stop him printing will not be present in America.

Things I stuffed up – edition one - Interest rate risk versus credit risk

Anybody that trades stocks makes mistakes. I have made plenty. I would prefer sweep those under the carpet but a little bit of healthy self-flagellation is good for the spirit. Besides I hope it will make me a better investor. Besides I just posted that I purchased Ambac - something that could (easily) wind up as the next mistake. So you should know just how much I stuff up.

So this is the first of (almost certainly) many posts detailing things I stuffed up.

The list for the first choice is long. How about these?

(a) Believing that regional banks of Credit Agricole (which are very good) would offset the losses at the investment bank (which is very bad). Stock is down from 36 to 12.

(b) Believing that the mortgage insurers would blow up this cycle but the bond insurers would probably be OK. Ambac is down 90 to 1ish and is no longer writing much business. MTG (which was my favourite short) is down from 60 to 6 but is writing plenty of business. Got the wrong shorts… and didn’t short the bond insurers…

(c) Believing that the (seemingly extreme) valuation difference between News Corp and other media stocks would solve itself by New Corp’s stock price rising. It didn’t as a stock price comparison of Viacom, Time Warner and News Corp will attest. (It was a wash – all the stocks lost a little.)

(d) Buying Origin Energy at under $2 and selling it at about $4 on the basis that the utility parts of the business were fully recognised. I sold it despite loving the management. It is currently under hostile takeover at $15.60 – and the Aussie dollar in which it is priced has almost doubled. I didn’t recognise just how good the gas assets were. This was non-trivial as the fund I worked for owned almost 5% of the company – and left more half a billion dollars on the table and it was my fault.

Against this it should be pretty hard to tell what the worst intellectual error I made in the past five years is. But I have a candidate. I thought that the interest rate risk in US banks would blow up before the credit risk.

Background

The US has a very unusual mortgage market. Most mortgages have the peculiar term of being fixed rate when rates are rising – but being refinanceable if rates fall. This means that customers pay more for their mortgages than most jurisdictions – but that all the interest rate risks fall on the financial sector.

For instance in most markets the difference between central bank fund rate and the average mortgage rate is less (often much less) than 200bps. In the US it is unusual to get a conventional mortgage at under 6 percent – and the feds fund rate is 200bps. Mortgage margins in the US are more than double most countries.

For this however the system as a whole takes an awful lot of interest rate risk. If short rates were to go to say 8 percent there would be 5-7 trillion in mortgages that yield less than that. Individual institutions might say they were hedged – but the system as a whole cannot be hedged.

I spent an awful lot of time looking for banks and other institutions that were particularly levered to interest rate risk. WestAmerica Bancorp (an otherwise pristine bank) stood out. If you look at the balance sheet I linked in my previous post you will see that it contains $1.5 billion in fixed rate securities financed floating. That number is very significant compared to pre-tax income of 120 million or tangible book value of about 270 million. And WABC is by no means the largest offender.

My back of the envelope calculation was that the system had about 400 billion of pre-tax profits. That included all brokers, all banks, all insurance companies, fund managers – the works.

The US system had 7 trillion of interest rate miss-match. Almost half the profits of the entire US financial system could disappear in a 200bps rise in rates across the yield curve. And they would have disappeared without a penny of credit losses. A lot of institutions would lose their profits entirely. They would in my view all try to hedge simultaneously guaranteeing the dynamic hedging strategies that were in place did not work.

And I thought with Alan Greenspan setting the tone of the Fed the stuff up on inflation and hence interest rates was inevitable. Greenspan never saw a problem he could not fix by pumping more liquidity into the system. I thought Helicopter Ben was even more likely to use a little inflation to get the US out of its mess. Indeed that is where the “helicopter” moniker comes from – a speech to that effect. So essentially whilst I thought that credit problems were sort of inevitable – the US would inflate their way out – and hence the real manifestation would be an interest-rate-risk debacle.

So I spent a couple of years getting completely obsessed about interest rate risk. It led to some OK shorts (eg Fannie and Freddie) but meant I underestimated the credit story.

The credit risk I thought had been passed pretty heavily to the non-bank sector. It existed in the Europeans (I sort of knew about UBS). It existed in the investment banks (including Citigroup). It existed in some regional banks (I knew about Bank United). But I was stunned it wound up quite so bad at Fifth Third. Just stunned.

I thus covered a Fifth Third short many years ago. (Ooops.) I was short a bunch of interest rate risk sensitive banks (such as North Fork which was purchased by Capital One) and I didn’t short MBIA and Ambac. Indeed I was tempted to go long (but fortunately I did not). I made money on a few interest rate shorts – but altogether it was not a profitable activity.

A few years ago the short end of the yield curve was at about 1%. The long end in the 4s and quasi-government guaranteed mortgages were in the high 5s. Borrowing short to buy Fannie Mae backed mortgages was the seeming no-lose trade. Everyone was on it. It didn’t even carry much credit risk because everyone knew the government backed Fannie.

However it carried – and still carries – massive interest rate risk. Everyone seemed to ignore that. My usual reaction – if everyone is doing something then it will probably lose you money. I would rather be on the other side.

Still I remain convinced that this is a theme that will play out. Warren Buffett says inflation is heating up – and he doesn’t stretch the duration of his assets.

There are good people who think inflation is highly unlikely. Paul Krugman (who I admire) suggests that Bernanke should ignore the inflation naysayers. Mish writes for ever on how inflation is not likely – see here and here for examples.

I will get back to this shortcoming one day soon.

John